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In the days when Appeasement was in full flower, from 
the 15 September 1938 Munich Conference to the 15 March,1939 
occupation of Prague, the governments of both Great Britain 
and France invited Reichsgruppe Industrie, the "peak organiza-
tion" for business in national socialist Germany, to join 
their national industry associations in the formation of 
cartels to divide global markets, international consortia to 
undertake turnkey projects in the colonies, and joint·ventures 
to reconstruct the economy of fascist Spain. The businessmen 
of the Reich w:ere, then, called upon to "save the peace" by 
joining with their Anglo-French colleagues in exploiting the 
rest of the world for their mutual benefit. 1 
The idea, while futile, was no mere will o' the wisp. 
It was rather an effort to elaborate on a theme whose import-
ance is still largely unrecognized, namely the development to 
replace discredited laissez-faire of a new cormnon outlook 
among the businessmen of Western Europe. It can be subsumed 
under the heading "industrial self-:-government." The Reich 
was its place of origin. By the late 1920s the important 
pranches of German industry were organized into cartels and 
trade associations. Under the aegis of such bodies, whose 
functions were in fact often interchangeable, markets could 
be allocated, prices maintained, patents exchanged, l•ration-:-
alizat±on" plans formulated and put into practice,. labor 
disciplined, and g.overnments influenced. Advocates extolled 
"industrial self:e-government '' as a solution to the problems 
2 
of industry, national economic policy,- and even international 
diplomacy. 2 
In the Western Europe of the Depression years, "industrial 
self-government" became the dominant big business philosophy. 
In Britain, its main proponents were initially to be found 
within the ministries---Board of Trade, Foreign Office, Trea-
sury, The Bank of England, etc. After 1931, and sometimes in 
the teeth of strong opposition; the National Government vigor-
ously promoted the formation of· industry associations and 
cartels with a view to the somewhat contrary purposes of both 
protection and modernization. In France, laissez~faire had 
been discredited in fact if not in theory by 1929; agreements 
in restraint of .trade existed in every branch of the French 
economy. There the new outlook develope'd first from within 
the technocracy' and big business. Prominent figures from 
these circles exercised pressure on the government throughout 
i 
the 1930s to make use of industry associations for the forma-
tion and implementation of national economic policy. In 
Belgium, the advocates came from within the management of the 
holding companies which dominated the nation's economy. They 
imposed German organizational methods within industry, while 
at the same time effectively making national economic policy 
·3 
from behind the scenes. In the Reich itself, finally, 
"industrial self-government" becaine the official economic 
doctrine of national socialism. Exi~ting industry associa-
tions were strengthened, new ones formed, and the whole 
3 
edifice of organized business re-named Reichsgruppe Industrie. 
Its branch-industry components, the Wirtschaftsgruppen, took 
over the responsibility of managing the conversion to the 
4 rearmament economy. By the time of Munich, in other words, 
cartels and producer associations existed for every branch 
of industry in each of the industrial nations of Western 
Europe, and those who viewed them as instruments of a new 
. 
approach to doing business were well-positioned in their 
respective economies. 
The Anglo-French idea that this common outlook could 
provide the basis of a general diplomatic settlement-with,the 
Reich was based above all on the good relations existing be-
tween the heavy industry of their nations and that of the 
dominant producer area in Western Europe, the Ruhr. The 
·most important monument to them was the "second" International 
Steel Cartel formed in February 1933 by the producers of the 
Reich, France, Belgium,'and Luxembourg. Britain joined {tin 
April 1935. The entente not only dealt satisfactorily with 
the main export problems facing the industry but also those 
resulting from llpolitics"---shifts in borders, changes in 
tariff structures, competitive devaluations, and the imposition 
of import and export quotas. The alliance in steel generated 
complementary arrangements in coal. The Reich formed ententes 
in both coke and coal with its main competitor, Great Britain, 
to which the other European exporters eventually subscribed. 




France and the Bel-Lux union. These ties held implications 
for the long-run development of the national industries involved 
which, in some respects, outweigh their immediate importance in 
. the diplomacy of the post-Munich period. Behind the Anglo-
French "economic appeasement" initiative was, at any rate, the 
hope that the "community of i~terest" in Western European heavy 
industry could be worked into a broader settlement for industry 
as a whole. 
The Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft (IRG) was formed 
25 February 1933 by representatives from the national steel 
producer associations of Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxem-
burg and grew in size and strength until the suspension of its 
~perations on 1 September 1939. On 30 April 1935 the British 
Federation of Steel Industries became ~ssociated with it, 
thereafter forming with the original signatories ("the Conti-
nental Group") the larger entity known as the Eu:i;-opean Steel 
Cartel. The producers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland 
entered the latter over the following year, comprising a 
third, if minor faction, the "Central European Group." 
Finally, in November 1937 the' four major American steel pro-
ducers, represented by the Steel Export Association of the 
United States, affiliated with the Europeans. Among steel 
exporters, only Japan and Sweden.remained formally outside 
IRG. By 1938., over 85 percent of world steel exports were 
directly under its control. Its delegates assembled about once 
a month to settle problems arising from within the industry 
5 
and changes in the general business environment, discourage 
competition from outside, and extend the reach of the cartel 
itself. 5 
The strength of the IRG was due first of all to the adop-
tion by its signatories of German methods of "industrial self-
government." When the original International Steel Cartel 
was organized in 1926, analogues to the Stahlwerksverband did 
not exist elsewhere. One of the purposes behind the formation 
of the IRG was in fact to cartelize domestic markets through 
regulatfon of exports. The 1926 agreement assigned each sig-
natory a global production quota. The amounts which could 
not be exported through existing "sectional" cartels for 
specialized products were to be absorbed on the domestic 
market. Success was only partial. The French revived the 
Comptoir Siderurgique, which was effective. The Belgian 
industry, however, remained disorganized and the domestic 
market was too small to absorb export surpluses. Belgian 
underselling in fact wrecked the original IRG in 1932. Great 
Britain, for its part, was committed to free trade and there-
£ t 't 6 ore was no a party to i. 
The operation of the 1933 agreement presupposed effective 
cartelization of domestic markets. On 31 May 1933 a coopera-
tive commercial company, "Cosibel" (Comptoir- de Vente de la 
Siderurgie Belge), was founded to operate as a selling agent 
on the Belgian ~arket. In the new agreement a clear distinc-
tion could then be made between domestic and foreign sales. 
6 
Crude steel export quotas, subdivided by product, were assigned 
on a sliding scale which, as exports increased, favored pro-
ducers with large domestic economies such as France and Germany 
but, as they fell, favored the export-dependent industries of 
Belgium and Luxemburg.* A number of reorganized, and some new, 
"sectional" cartels underpinned the structure of the IRG, those, 
in particular, for semi-finished products, structural shapes, -
merchant bars, thick plates,.medium plates, wire rods,. hot 
rolled bands and strips, cold rolled bands and strips, ·piled 
sheets, black sheets, galvanized sheets, rails, wire, tubes, 
and tin plates. Wholesaling was by means of comptoirs, which 
existed for each specialized manufacture. There ..were three 
kinds of dealers: those belonging to·mernber-firms, compto'ir 
agents, and "authorized" importers on exclusive contract. 7 
* TOTAL ANNUAL CRUDE STEEL VALUE 
OF EXPORTED COMMODITIE·s 
6.8 million 11.5 million 
metric tons metric tons 
or less or more 
% % 
Germany-Saar 29.2 33.7 
Belgium 29.0 26.0 
France 20.6 23.5 
Luxemburg 21.2 16.8 
100 100 
7 
The IRG was held together both by the superior economic 
perfonnance of the Eur.opean steel industry and the diplomatic 
-skill of its members. World steel production increased from 
66.~3 long tons i~ 1933 to 133.28 long tons in 1938, an historic 
high. While the .export trade _never fully recovered, reaching 
;,. 
only80 percent of 1929by 1938, the four European founder-
members enjoyed a disproportionate gain in exports, which 
increased from 3.5 million tons in 1933 to 7 .. 1 million in 1938, 
·the gains being shared between them on the basis of the quota 
agreements. The IRG probably deserves credit for the improve-
ment in steel export prices which occurred during these years, 
since considerable production capacity in both Belgium and 
Luxemburg remained idle even during 19.38. It is. also true that 
by resorting to embargo and underselling, or threats of the 
same, the IRG was often able to frustrate the plans of would-
be competitors. The IRG did not promote the kind of "ration-
alization" efforts which might have brought the European 
_industry abreast of U.S. standards of competitiveness. It 
was at least partly responsible, however, for the restoration 
of several continuous years of profitability to-British and 
German· steel and at least intermittent ones to the industries 
8 of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg. More importantly, the 
leaders of the cartel headed off a succession of political 
crises. In so doing, they forged the-bonds of a "community 
of interest," which, in its essentials, has survived up to the 
present. 
8 
There were three such alliances. The first, most funda-
mental, closest, enduring, and significant of them was between 
the steel producers of the Ruhr and Lorraine. It developed from 
the settlement of the problems arising as a result of the end 
on 10 January 1925 of duty-free entry into the Reich of raw 
materials and finished products. Rather than face a tariff 
war, the Ruhr ceded an import quota, the famous "contingent 
lorrain-luxembourgeois," to producers now cut off from the pre-
1918 Reich customs area. Thanks to this arrangement, which 
was concluded 4 November 1926, the Lorrainers found markets 
for their excess capacities of semi-finished steel. The Ruhr, 
for its part, averted the imposition of tariffs which might 
have eliminated the French market for German-manufactured 
goods and encouraged the growth of competition. The conclu-
sion of a Franco-German trade treaty as well as the original 
I • 
International Steel Cartel (which also included Belgium and 
Luxemburg) ·followed in short order. 9 
These arrangements created within France a powerful 
interest group whose aim it was to promote economic and poli-
tical cooperation.with the Reich. Its fortress was the Comit~ 
des Forges, a body dominated by the Laurent and De Wendel 
families of Lorraine. It numbered a few prominent supporters 
from within industry (such as Henri de Peyremhoff of the comite 
de houillieres, Rene Duchemin of Ets. Kuhlmann), the technocracy 
(Coutrot, Branger), and the world of opinion-making (such as 
the publicist Wladimir d'Ormesson, the historian Lucien Romer, 
;:. 
9 
and the sociologist Andre Siegfried). It could count on favor-
able treatment from an influential section of the press. Big 
' 
industrialists owned four Paris dailies outright, Le Temps, 
, I\ , . 
Le Journal des Debats, L'Information, and La Journee Indus-
trielle. They subsidized ten others. 1° From September 1931 
to October 1938 the group was well-represented in Berlin,. 
namely by the French Ambassador Andre Fran9ois-Poncet. He 
was a director of both the Comite des Forges and the foundry 
Ets. Japy. His first speech, a plea for Franco-German indus-
trial cooperation, would provide the leitmotiv of the tenure-
ship of "Hitler's favorite ambassador. 1111 And he, 'along with 
his colleagues in France, were determined to make it work even 
in the face of political obstacles. 
The second a1·1iance was between. the Franco-German bloc 
✓ , , ., 
and the two holding companies (the Societe Generale de Belgique 
•· 
and the Banque de Bruxelles) which together dominated the coal 
and steel industries of Belgium. It was forged as a result of 
the crisis precipitated by the British decisions of September 
1931 to devalue the Pound by 30 percent and of the following 
February to impose a 33-1/3 percent ad valorem tariff on.steel 
imports. Belgium, traditionally a free-trader, had responded 
to the onset of Depression by cutting steel export prices by 
50 percent, a move which, while eliminating profitability, 
made possible an increase in its share of wo'rld exports from 
9.8 percent in 1929 to 11.5 percent in 1931. It offered the 
additional advantage of maintaining demand for high-cost 
10 
Belgian coking. coal. The British shift to protection cut Bel-
gian steel off from the market which previously had absorbed 
one-third of total exports, caused the financial collapse of a. 
number of independent foundries, jeopardized the future of the 
mines, resulted in massive coal and steel dumping on the French 
and German markets, and left the holding companies little choice 
but eventually to enter_negotiations with the Franco-German 
bloc for a new inter~ational steel cartei. 12 The Belgians in 
fact launched the initiatives which resulted in the formation 
of the "second" International Steel Cartel in February 1933. 
The decision to join the entente, it is clear in retro-
spect, transformed Belgium into an economic dependency of the 
Reich. The IRG agreement entailed a prospective decrease over 
the long-run in steel exports., and the share of the country in 
1938 world exports was in fact only 2.9 percent as opposed to 
4.2 percent in 1930. Demand for Belgian coal shrank accord-
. l 13 ing y. The holding companies therefore counted increasingly 
on support from the Reich to improve the admittedly difficult 
Belgian situation. Ruhr steel, always at their request, 
administered frequent "brow-beatings" to recalcitrant indepen-
dent foundries, threatening at times to undercut them in 
specialized export markets and at others intervening in com-
plicated quota disputes within "Cosibel. 1114 As for Belgian 
coal, its survival came to depend on the ·restraint of compe-
tition from the Ruh,r, toleration by IRG of occasional "excess-
ive" steel exports, and complicated arrangements linking the 
12 
sale of Ruhr bunker coal through Antwerp to transport in Belgian 
bottoms.
15 
These arrangements, then, tied Belgium inextricably 
into the heavy industry "community of interest" in Western 
Europe. 
The third bond linked Great Britain to the "Continental 
Group." It grew out of a crisis deliberately provoked by a 
March 1935 increase in the British steel tariff to 50 percent. 
The immediate purpose. behind it was to force the producers of 
Belgium, France and Germany---all major exporters to Britain 
---to enter negotiations leading to British entry into the 
international steel cartel. Here the National Government was 
pursuing its long-term strategy of-promoting "industrial self-
government" through international agreements. 16 Negotiations 
· were in fact swiftly concluded. The British demand for an · 
export quota occasioned· little controversy.· More importantly, 
the British ceded an annual import quota of 525,00-670,000 tons 
to the Continent, the distribution of which, however, was 
tied to the machinery of the newly-formed British Iron and 
Steel Federations. The tariff increase was then repealed. 17 
The'achievements of the National Government's strategy, 
though few, sufficed to sustain it. The 1932 tariff which, 
it was hoped, would provide a "breathing space" permitting the 
steel industry to modernize, did encourage mergers. Thanks 
to interventions by the Bank of England,_ 60 percent of steel 
production had been concentrated into vertical combines. By 
1934. production was· running at 1929 levels. Costs ·and prices, 
13 
however, continued to iricrease. 18 Affiliation with IRG after 
1935 did not significantly change this situation. The British 
nonetheless took the lead in the negotiations which led to U.S. 
affiliation with the international steel cartel and initiated 
the discussions which led to the wider agreements in coke and 
· . 19 
coal. And it was in Britain, of course, where Economic 
Appeasement was first raised to the level of foreign policy. 
The "community of interest" in the heavy industry of 
Western Europe was, then, a fact of life after 1933. The 
.governments of the Reich, France, and Great Britain {not to 
mention Belgium) could either ignore it at their own peril or 
use it for their own purposes. They could not, however, over-
ride it. What was in fact the relationship between it arid the 
foreign policies of the Great Powers? The matter requires 
much closer examination than it has yet received. Historians 
and public alike have accepted with near-unanimity the crude 
judgment that the international heavy industry cartels provided 
Hitler the means to exercise a sort of dictatorship over world 
steel production. 20 . While it is true that their existe~ce 
proved beneficial to the Reich, the relationship between them 
and Hitler's foreign policy is indirect and due also to the 
intermediation of France and Britain. 
Hitler lacked any policy towards internati.onal ententes 
other than one of expediency. They we.re less desired than 
grudgingly tolerated. The Party was traditionally hostile to 
cartels of any sort, which its spokesmen denounced in principle 
14 
as agencies of irresponsible capitalist power. Initial threats 
from the regime to abolish them diminished, however, as they 
demonstrated their usefulness, first, as instruments of recover-
ery policy and then of rearmament. In July 1933 the Reich pub-
lished a decree, applied to tobacco and cement in early 1934, 
allowing compulsory cartelizatio'n where necessary to prevent 
unemployment. 21 With the creation of Wirtschaftsgruppen as 
official organs of "industrial self-government," cartelization 
was extended to those branches of industry where it did not 
already exist. Cartels and. Wirtschaftsgrup2en together there-
after took on the role of policy-administration within the 
armament economy, determining the distribution of raw material 
and foreign exchange and, to an extent, coordinating production 
as well. 
The Reich's critical shortage of foreign exchange after 
1933, which was aggravated by the decision to re-arm, left it 
with no choice but to work through the fr~ework of agreements 
anchored in the international steel cartei. 22 The Reich 
enjoyed a trade and payments surplus in Western Europe thanks 
largely to the annual export there of about 20 million tons 
of coal. Without it the Reich would have been deprived of 
the raw materials required by the.rearmament effort. To main-
tain this trade, the steel industries of Western Europe- had, 
in a word, to be provided with adequate operating levels. It 
is apparently in part for this reason that the regime never 
pressured the Ruhr to demand an increase in the German export 
quota. In any case, once the rearmament boom had begun, steel 
15 
and coal shortages were felt on the domestic economy, thus 
reducing official pressure to export either commodity. 
The leaders of Ruhr heavy industry, while never "dis-
loyal" to the regime, cooperated on the .whole unenthusiastic-
ally. The chief German representative to the IRG, Ernst 
Poensgen, overcame the initial opposition of the majority of 
the steel industry to joining the IRG with the argument that 
the only alternative to membership was a high steel tariff 
which would put the industry at the, mer.cy of the regime. 24 
Conflict between the two parties later broke out, of course, 
over the refusal of the industry to increase its consumption 
of low-grade domestic ore---something that would have wrought 
havoc with its cost structure---and was intensified by the 
decision to construct Reichswerke Hermann GOring, a regime-
subsidized enterprise which broke the Ruhr steel-producing 
monopoly. 25 After the onset of full employment in· 1937, 
repeated disagreements over delivery priorities perpetuated 
the ill-feelings. The Ruhr found itself often being,ordered 
to step up domestic sales of steel and coal, as well as those 
to politically-preferred foreign buyers such as Italy._ It 
therefore had to sacrifice, forfeit, or hand over traditional 
customers such as, for instance, ARBED of Luxemburg, the 
b . . 1 . h f k' 1 
26 
iggest singe foreign pure aser o •co ing coa. Within 
the international cartels it made sense, then, for the Ruhr 
to act as Honest Broker. And so it did. It accepted·a very 
modest initial quota in the coal and coke conventions. In 
16 
addition, it effectively dealt out portions of its IRG quota 
with a view to increasing its capital of goodwill. 27 To those 
privy to international business.negotiations, German behavior 
thus presented itself in the guise of a paradox: as the 
aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign°policy increased, the Ruhr 
became more conciliatory. 
The National Government in Great Britain was, as Berndt-
Jftrgen Wendt has demonstrated in expaustive detail, the main 
progenitor of the attempt to build a diplomatic settlement 
with the Reich on the structure of international cartel agree-
ments.28 British affiliation with the IRG set a precedent: 
it was .followed by the conclusion of the Anglo-Germ~n naval 
agreement·of 18 June 1935. Successful conclusion of the 
negotiations in coal, it was hoped in the post-Munich days, 
would lead to a still broader settlement in industry, and 
even between the two nations as well. 
The Anglo-German Trade and Payments Convention of 1 
November 1934, which remained in effect until the outbreak 
of war, provided the framework for settlement of coal export 
issues. It assigned the Reich, which considered it "the 
best and most favorable of all clearing agreements," with a 
trade surplus in the proportion of 100:55. 29 Here, then, 
was powerful incentive for Germany to increase exports from 
Great Britain. Coal was simply the most convenient product 
to accept. In early 1932, the Reich imposed an import quota 
of 100,000 tons per month on British coal to stave off the 
" 
17 
flood of_the commodity through North Sea ports which otherwise 
would have resulted from the Pound devaluation. 30 Once the 
payments agreement had taken effect, however, the Reich exer-
cised pressure on the Rheinischwestf~lj.scheskohnlensyndikat 
not to compete in the Hamburg-Bremen market, and imports from 
Britain were allowed to increase to 193,118 tons per month by 
1937. 31 The share of the Reich in total British coal exports 
increased from 6.4 percent to 8.0 percent in the same years. 
The coal and coke negotiations, running intermittently 
for over four years, faced an obstacle in the form of British 
weakness which the Ruhr, however, overcame.thanks to judi-
cious use of its increasing strength. Britain first initiated 
discussions for a general coal-coke convention in March 1935. 
They continued for the duration of the year. 32 The Central 
Council, set up by the Coal Mines Act of 1930, was, however, 
.too divided to act on behalf of the entire British.industry. 
The Ruhr therefore favored including the other main Continental 
exporters (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland-) in any even-
tual agreement. There was confusion, finally, as to whether 
the convention should extent to coke as well as coal and 
include maritime as well as continental markets.
33 
An improvement in the Ruhr's situation paved the way to 
the conclusion of the Anglo-German coke convention of July 
1936. The settlement rested in particular on the Ruhr provid-
ing Britain compensation in the hitherto competitive Baltic-
Scandinavian market for the 12 percent of its total exports 
18 
market in Italy lost as a result of-the "Ethiopian embargo." 
The Anglo-Germans agreed that of total European coal exports 
of 11.4 million tons the Reich should receive a quota of 5.6 
million tons (48.4 percent) and Great Britain of 2.4 million 
tons (20.88 percent). The inclusion of the other three export-
ers was frustrated temporarily by chaotic conditions in Belgium, 
which had experienced labor strife, prospective regulation at 
the hands of a royal commission, and, finally, a short-lived 
boom due to the .devaluation in Marc~ 1935 of the Belga and 
labor problems at the French mines. On,11 June 1937, however, 
they also entered the convention. 34 · 
On 7 November 1938 Sir Frederick Leith-<Ross proposed to 
a German trade mission returning from Dublin a resumption of 
the coal talks, which had been proceeding in desultory fashion 
through most of the year. His has all the earmarks of-a well-
laid plan •. The Germans were 'presented with a detailed memo-
randum outlining ·a bargaining position. Total British coal 
sales, it was noted, had dropped by 20 percent since 1933 while 
those of the Reich had increased by a third, thus shifting 
Anglo-German export rations from 5:3 to 1:1 between that date 
and 1937. The memorandum holds a secret subsidy responsible 
for the absolute and relative decreases in German coal prices 
and proposes formation of a joint cartel as the only alterna-
tive to a "production tax on the use of coal." The Germans 
are also-reminded that they stand to benefit more from a 15-20 
' percent price increase to British levels than would be lost by 
19 
reduced sales. 35 Thanks to the ·"restraining influence exer~ 
cised by the Board of Trade on the representatives of the 
British, industry,_" negotiations proceeded past unusual disagree-
ments concerning the comparability of statistics and basis 
years for quotas; agreement was reached on 28 January 1939, 
Great Britain receiving a quota of 46.27 percent, the Reich, 
32.08 percent, and the rest left to be divided between the· 
three secondary exporters. 36 
To the "economic appeasers" at the Board of Trade and 
Foreign Office, the chief value of the coal agxeement was as 
a springboard to an interindustry pact between Britain and 
the Reich. "The coal trade talks," according to the President 
of the Board.of Trade Oliver Stanley, "have been valuable pre-
cursors to the wider talks now to start. From them we can 
draw many lessons and much encouragement ..• It might be· 
possible to look back upon [their] conclusion as a turning 
point, not only in the methods of Anglo-German' industrial 
relations, but also in the history and hopes of the world. 1137 
The famous IID-0.sseldorf Agr,eement" concluded between the 
Federation of British Industry and Reichsgruppe Industrie on 
16 March 1939 reflected these exalted ambitions. A joint 
public statement noted agreement on twelve points. Some·were 
pedestrian: existing cooperative efforts should be built on, 
exports should raise living standards and be profitable, and 
destructive competition should be ended. For the rest, the 
agreement foresaw nothing less than the creation of a world 
20 
economic partnership of the two countries. The National 
Government•·s long-standing policy of encouraging domestic 
cartelization along German lines was affirmed. Both parties 
concurred that, as with the coke and coal understandings, out-
siders were to be invited to enter only after Anglo-German 
agreement had been reached. Individual branches of industry 
were, moreover, directed to begin negotiations immediately 
with a view to forming bilateral cartels. Finally, the 
industry associations of both nations promised to invoke the 
powers of their respective governments, jointly if.necessary, 
to coerce.into compliance the industries of third countries. 38 
With this agreement, "economic appeasement" reached its high-
water mark. Once the Eublic had registered reaction to the 
15 of March occupation of Prague it was no longer politic for 
the government to speak openly about the desirability of reach-
ing mutually profitable deals .of any kind with the Hitler 
regime. 
In France, public animosity towards Germany simply ruled 
out .the.adoption of "economic appeasement" as national policy 
until, that is, the diplomatic system created by the Versailles 
treaty had visibly begun to collapse. From 1933 to 1936, 
Franco-German trade relations were allowed to <:!.eteriorate 
alarmingly~ Change in economic policy towards Germany, when 
it came in early 1937, was presented as mere "normalization" 
when, in fact, behind it was the hope, cultivated by the 
Comite des Forges, that mutual rearmament would bring 
21 
reciprocal benefits to both nations. Under Foreign Minister 
George Bonnet, finally, "economic appeasement" became official 
French foreign policy. For France it was even more of an 
absurdity than for Britain. 
"L'equilibre par le bas" was, according to Pierre Mendes-
France, the operative principle in Franco-German economic rela-
tions after the collapse of the 1927 trade treaty in 1932. 39 
German foreign exchange control, introduced that year, limited 
the sale of French agricultural goods on German markets. The 
French "mathematical clause," which followed, restricted 
German imports by product to fixed percentages of 1929. The 
28 July 1934 trade agreement brought a degree of order in the 
relations between the two, but at a large cost to French 
export interests. It provided for a large German trade sur-
plus, 15.75 percent of which was to service the Dawes and 
Young debt. 40 An unexpected increase in German purchases 
soon threatened, however, to dry up the Reich's Franc balance 
at the "Office franco-allemand des paiements commerciaux." 
In August 1935 the French government restricted exports to the 
Reich, first to 85 percent of 1935 and then further until 
such a time as Germany had "worked up" its payments surplus. 
By December 1936 the Franc balance had been restored, thanks 
in large part to a reduction of French exports from 189 
million RM in 1932 to 98 million RM in 1936. The stage was 
f b 
. . 41 set or a new eg1nn1ng. 
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Rearmament made it desirable for France, and arguably 
necessary, to revive the pre-World War I Ruhr coke-Lorraine 
ore traffic. The Ruhr normally supplied four-fifths of the 
coking coal requirements of the foundries of eastern France. 
Alternative suppliers were uncompetitive in the area and could 
\ 
only through strenuous exertions have met the anticipated 
increase in demand. The French, moreover, seem to have had 
doubts about Britain's reliability, not least of all because 
of her refusal to consult during the negotiations for the 
coal and coke understandings with the Reich. 42 
The relationship between Ruhr and Lorraine, on the other 
hand, remained close. The two. encountered little difficulty, 
for instance, in resolving the complicated issues which 
resulted from the return of the Saar to the. German customs 
area on 12 Februa.ry 1935. The Ruhr, first of all, agreed to 
absorb the 450,000 tons of steel per year which the Saar nor-
' mally sold on the French market, and, in return,·received a 
slight increase from the IRG in its export quota. Thus the 
French did not have to increase steel tariffs, an act which 
would have had serious adverse consequences for the Laurent 
rolling mills in Lorraine, ·which were normally supplied by 
their foundries in Dillingen (Saar). As for coal, agreement 
was reached for German purchase of the French state-owned Saar 
mines by means of payment in kind.· The transfers were handled 
through the special nsicap" arrangement. By 1936 coal, most 
of it from the Saar, was in fact the only important German 
23 
export commodity to France. 43 
Negotiations for a new coke-ore agreement, conducted 
privately between representatives of French and German heavy 
industry, began in March 1937. 44 German industry in fact 
stood to gain comparatively little from it. The Ruhr had 
little coal to sell and, in addition., was quite satisfied 
with its supply relationship with Sweden which, it believed, 
could be developed as required by ·rising demand. Schacht, 
however, seized on the initiative as opening a new source of 
fo.reign exchange. 45 The ore-coke agreement arrived at called, 
first, for an increase in German iron-ore imports from the 1935 
monthly average of 490,000 to 600,000, it being understood 
that amounts could be raised once "labor difficulties" had 
been solved. More significantly, German coke deliveries to 
France were to be immediately stepped up from a monthly rate 
of 116,000 tons per month to 275,000 tons. It was understood, 
finally, that "The French have agreed to fill all of their 
coke import requirements from Germany. 1146 
The coke-ore agreement was the nucleus of the 10 July 
1937 trade treaty signed with fanfare by ReichsbankprAsident 
Schact and French Foreign MinisterDelbos at the Paris Exposi-
tion. The French business press, indeed the public, received 
it enthusiasticaliy. 47 The men most directly involved in the 
negotiations heralded it as the .dawn of a new era in Franco-
German relations. The German embassy telegrammed Berlin that 
"Handelsminister [Chapsal] hielt sehr beachtliche Tischrede. 
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Nach Begrfissung der Ga.ste betonte er zungchst gros-se Bedeut~ng 
Vertragswerks, die weit tlber solche gewOhnlichen Warenabkornmens 
hinausgehe und als Ganges eine gltlckliche Liquidierung-zahl-
reicher anderer zwischen beiden ia.ridern offener Fragen mit sich 
bringe. Er selbst und franzOsische Regierung seien glftcklich 
fiber das Erreichte, das geeignet sei, die Beziehungen zwischen 
beiden La.ndern zu normalisieren und eine weitere Zusarnmenarbeit 
im friediichen Einvernehmen zu gewghrleisten~ Abschluss Ver-
tragswerks stellte somit in den Augen franzOsischer Regierung 
gewissermassen einen feierlichen Augenbl1ck dar und sei 
II 
geeignet, eine neue Ara des Vertrauens und der Anna.herung in 
den Beziehungen der beiden Nationem einzuleiten. Er sei 
sicher, dass diese Geffihl franzOsischer Regierung von sgmt-
lichen FranzOsen geteilt wftrden, die-in den Beziehungen zu 
Deutschland nichts sehnlichster Wfinschten als eine 'atmosphere 
plus calme, plus apaissee et amicale.' Das Vertragswerk 
stelle somit einen Ausgangspuhkt ~ar, bei dem man nicht Halt 
machen dtlrfe ... -48 This was not the mere expression of pious 
sentiments. To insure the proper functioning of the coke-ore 
exchange, the French Government-extended the work week at the 
mines beyond forty hours, encouraged management to recruit 
several thousand additional workers---foreigners if necessary, 
and even directed French steel to provision itself to the maxi-
mum extent possible from the Ruhr mines. In January 1938 it 
specifically disallowed the placement of a large coke order 
. . 49 in Belgium.· 
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French post-Munich "economic appeasement'' reached the 
same fantastic heights as in Britain. Acting at the direction 
of Foreign Minister Bonnet, Count de la Baurne (Head of the 
Commercial Relations Section at the Quai d'Orsay) entered nego-
tiations with a German trade delegation on 7 December 1938. 50 
The most important of the many French proposals made over the 
next three months fall under three headings. They involved, 
first, a trade increase. In exchange for a German readiness 
, to accept increased agricultural exports, France promised to 
import 50 million Francs worth of synthetic nitrogen and to 
provide German firms with public contracts (machine tools, 
diverse machinery, scientific instruments, etc.) in the value 
of 95 million Francs. The proposals also involved the forma-
tion of joint ventures, particularly within the Empire~ De la 
Baurne suggested "in a general way" harbor improvements in South 
America, bridge and road building in t_he Balkans, and railway 
construction in Africa. A Franco-German consortium, it was 
suggested, should be set up to handle repair and recovery work 
in Franco Spain. A note of 11 March 1939 specifies with regard 
to the Empire: the opening of the Conakry m:i,ne for mutual 
exploitation, a joint paper manufacturing project, and the 
expansion of the Moroccan manganese mines to meet rising Reich 
demand. Other collaborative efforts are to include the con-
clusion of a contract between Societe francaise de Chatillon-:. 
Comrnentry and Vereinigte Stahlwerke to barter 10 million francs 
of machine tools for the ore mine at Halouze (Orne) against 
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delivery over a two-year period of one-half of planned production 
of 300,000 tons per year. The third set of proposals involved 
the immediate "adaptation aux circonstances presentes des 
ententes industrielles existantes et l'extension des ententes 
d · 11 ' • · • n51 a es nouve es categories de production. Planning for dis-
cussions between the Confederation General·e du Patronat and 
the Chambre de Commerce de· Paris on the one ha~d and Reichsgruppe 
Industrie on the other were to·begin at once for the conclusion 
of a general inter-industry pact. 11 Ces diverses propositions," 
let it be added, "ne constituent qu'une pre:tniere etape dans la 
voie d'echanges plus actifs entre les deux pays. Mais la 
realisation de ce programme initial pourra servir d'exemple 
·dans l'avenir pour la conclusion d'aff~ires nouvel.les. Le 
Gouvernement fran~ais espere que les negotiations que vent 
s'ouvrir, tant e~tre les services officiels des deux pays 
qu'entre les industriels, sous le controle gouvernementale, 
permettront d'etablir des bases d'une vast col:laboration 
favorable a l'economie des deux pays~ 1152 On 22 February 1939, 
a "C~ntre Economique-Franco Allemand" was founded. It had 
" .•• zur Aufgabe, die deutsch-franz5sischeri Wirtschaftsbezie-
hungen mit allen Mitteln praktisch zu f5rdern, zu zentralisieren 
und auszuweiten ••• Das 'Centre' wird gegrftndet van namhaften 
ParJ.ementariern und den Pr!sident der grBssten frariz5sischen 
Handelskammern. 1153 
These ambitions must be seen against the dismal failure 
in the recovery of Franco-German trade. The industrialists of 
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France and Germany were, in effect, being .asked to "divide the 
world" at a time when French exports to the Reich had fallen to 
one-quarter of 1929 levels (64L99 million RM to 155.68 million 
RM), -and Gennan exports to France to one-third (934. 54 million 
to 313.43 million RM). Total French exports·to the Reich, 
which rose to 155 million RM in 1937, actually fell to 141 
million RM the following year, below the previous low of 281 
million RM in 1934. 54 The results of the coke-ore exchange 
were most disappointing of all. German deliveries of coke, 
targeted at 275,000 tons per month, fell to 113,000 tons per 
month in the first third of 1938 and even further, to 90,000 
tons per month, in the same period a year later. French ore 
deliveries to the Reich fell to a rate of 416,000 tons per 
month in 1938. 55 
These results provided little basis indeed upon which 
to build an economic partnership with the Reich. The French 
initiatives were in fact notably less successf'l~l than the 
British. Surveys of ReichsgrupE_e Industrie revealed, if any-
thing, a general disinclination to forming industrial ententes 
with partners_ in France. One file note divided German indus-
try policy towards the matter into three categories. Ententes, 
it specified, existed already in steel (including ·the products 
covered by the "sectional" subsidiaries of IRG), safety pins, 
and enameled cast iron, in the electrical industry, and in 
buttons. Other industries, secondly, sought closer agreement 
with French partners.. The refiners of non-ferrous metals 
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wanted to include the French in existing conventions with the 
Belgians and Dutch. The electrical industry wanted more speci-
fic agreements with regard to third country markets; the 
machine industry, participation in turnkey projects, specific-
ally in the colonies; the railroad car industry, the right 
to sel.l to the SNCF. The manufacturers of wood~working 
power tools sought to break the Paris monopoly of French com-
petitors; the fur industry, to gain more finishing operations 
from French tanners; the ceramic industry, to reach agreement 
regarding third country markets. The hand tool industry hoped 
to reach price agreements with the "Syndicat National des 
fabricants d'outils de Metier," as did the tin-box packing 
industry, and the founders of cast fittings. A third group 
of producers expressed "virtually no interest" or none what-
soever in the formation of ententes. It included the textile 
industry, the garment industry, the iron war group, the steel 
and plate war group, paper manufacturers, and the metal wares 
group. 56 Koppen, the Reichsgruppe official in charge of nego-
tiating with the French, therefore concl.uded in a letter of 
2 March 1939 that "trotz Befragung der gesamten industriellen 
Organisation keine ·nennenswerte WOnsche fttr Verhandlungen 
mit der franzOsische Industrie zugegangen sind. Wo deutscher-
seits ein Bedttrfniss fttr Marktabreden bestand, sind diese 
bereits getroffen worden und haben sich im·allgemeinen gut 
bewahrt. Allzuviel Material werden wir also filr deutsch-
. 57 
franzOsische Industriebesprechungen kaum besteuern k~nnen. 11 
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He therefore handled the matter in dilatory fashion until the 
possibility of a second "Dfl.sseldorf Agreement" died of its own 
inanition. 
· The success of the Anglo-French efforts to broaden the 
"communities of interest" between their national industries 
and that of the Reich required a much more radical initiative 
than any apparently contemplated by either government, i~volv-
ing namely the revision of the bilateral trade agreements in 
effect with the Reich. They had been set up with a view pri-
marily to protecting the interests of the Reich's c.reditors. 
Frank Tiark of the City.branch of the Schroeder bank, who 
served as head of the "Short-term Creditor Committee,_" de-
serves primary credit as architect of the trade.imbalance 
provisions built into the 1 November 1934 Anglo-German trade 
agreement. The French, for their part, were extremely reluc-
tant either to allow the Reich to earn more francs than neces-
sary· to service their debt-holders or to maintain large 
Reichsmark balances of their own. Thus the Vertragslosenzustand 
of 1935-1936 in which the government of France restrained its 
exporters in order to permit the re-accumulation of a German 
F-ranc surplus. The July 1937 agreement "mortgaged" 700.-800 
million Francs of a targeted German trade surplus of 1500 
million Francs for service of the Dawes and Young debt. An 
increase in the balance wouldr in other word~, put additional 
foreign exchange in German hands, a decrease, threaten. the 
interests of French creditors. 
• 
30 
The paraiyzing effects of th.ese agreements on trade were 
recognized in a general way. Lip service was paid, for instance, 
to the "Van Zeeland Plan," a vague set of prescriptions for 
harmonizing the trade practices of ·"totalitarian" economies 
with the supposedly "free" ones of the democracies. French 
and British trade negotiators did almost nothing, however, to 
remedy the specific deficiencies of the agreements in effect 
with the Reich, even as their ministries were seeking to create 
inter-industry pacts. British trade officials, first of all, 
gave no satisfaction to the large section of the manufacturing 
industry which voiced the complaint that because of the trade, 
imbalance provisions (and the preferred position of coal) 
they faced increased competition on the domestic market from 
the Reich while, at the same time, being forbidden to export 
there. Demands from British manufacturers that the "Dilsseldorf 
Agreement" be predicated on German re-consideration of import 
quotas fell on deaf ears. Their eventual loyalty to it must 
f b . t' 58 there ore e put into ques ion. 
French officials, at the same time, stood by with apparent 
helplessness as the rigidities built into the July 1937 agree-
ment brought on a near-collapse in commercial relations with 
the Reich. The reaction is puzzling, to say the least. The 
fall in Franco-German trade cannot be attributed simply to the 
declining French production index because, in 1937-1938, 
1 . d .. d 59 overal French foreign tra e increase • Nor can it be 
argued that it was due to patriotic considerations, inasmuch 
.. 
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as the maintenance of the ore-coke trade was of considerably 
greater strategic value to France than the Reich. Nor did 
Germany refuse to export coke which, though in short supply, 
became an actual bottleneck to trade only in Spring 1939. 60 
As it was, a fall in French steel production and ore output 
occurred in Fall 1937, allegedly as a result of labor diffi-
culties. It resulted in an immediate decline in the French 
demand for coke, a reduction in German exports of the product, 
to France, and a threat to the German Franc balance. Once 
again, the French government found itself in the position of 
restraining exports, even in the face of opposition from both 
the management and employees of the ore mines. 61 Until June 
1939 it gave scant consideration to available measure's to 
stimulate a trade increase: lowering the interest rates paid 
on Dawes and Young coupons or underwriting a portion of the 
.debt (thus reducing the need for a German trade surplus) ; 
stockpiling coke and coal for its own account in the interests 
of rearmament; or simply subsidizing ore exports by accepting 
paym~nt in overvalued Reichsmarks. By then, however, trade 
had decreased to such an extent as to threaten unhinging for 
the first time since 1926 the close relations between Lorraine 
and Ruhr. The July 1939 negotiations for a renewal of the 
bila·teral trade treaty simply fell apart. And the French dele-
gate, de Menzie, departed to the U.S. on a mission to purchase 
the amounts of.coal which the Reich, by abrogating an.agree-





French foundries outside the framework of the bilateral trade 
treaty, had refused to deliver. 62 
"Economic appeasement" is, to say the very least, diffi-
cult to defend as a policy. It rested on a rnisund~rstanding of 
the relationship between German industry and Hitler's foreign 
policy, lacked public support, involved conflict with existing 
diplomatic commitments, was lamed by internal contradictions and 
pursued too late---then only halfheartedly. It could only have 
reinforced Hitler's belief- in the spinelessness of the Anglo-
French leadership. 
The ideas underlying it nonetheless lived on. Sir Samuel 
Beale, Chairman of the Board at Guest, Keen, ahd Nettlefolds, 
Ltd., .and chief business representative to the Board of Trade's 
Export Council, continued throughout the war to defend the 
"Dttsseldorf Agreement," arguing that "in the present state of 
the world's technical and political development, international 
competition on the old basis is uneconomic." He felt that 
" ... [American] social and political evolution is perhaps 
twenty or thirty years behind that of Great Britain." "A 
greater degree of economic centralism will," he added, 
"gradually develop in the U.S. sooner or later, [which] is 
inevitable and healthy ..• and will, let it be hoped, be rapid 
enough in the sphere of foreign trade to permit the organiza-
tion of post war international commerce in industrial goods 
[into cartels]. 1163 In Benelux, but above all in France, defeat 
appeared as a blessing in disguise to technocratic visionaries 
such as Bichelonne, Pucheu, Lehideux, and the men associated 
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. h h 64 wit t e Banque Worms. ·They• welcomed t:he opportunity to 
Germanize the structures of the French economy, expand the 
apparatus of "industrial self-government" to include respon-
sibility for raw materials allocation, "rationalization" and 
long-term planning, and to enlist the Reich in setting up 
European multinational enterprises in the fields· of chemicals, 
automobile manufacture, and steel production. Responsibility 
for the conduct of relations with the industry of occupied 
Western Europe rested by and large with German industry, and 
was successful to the extent that strong ,pre-war cartel ties 
existed and, less often, where new ones could be developed. 65 
It is true that the war might have lasted longer had the Reich 
taken better advantage of the offers for cooperation made by 
the business and civil service leaders in France, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. Of perhaps still greater interest, how-
ever, is the fact that in occupied Europe continuity of busi-
ness tradition was preserved. - The pre-war cartels in Western 
European heavy industry survived even the aftermath of German 
defeat. They emerged from it re-baptised as the European 
1 d 1 
. 66 Coa an Stee Community. The formation of the Common 
Market, then, can be regarded as a distant echo _of the hopes 
expressed by the "economic appeasers" of the post-Munich 
period: that the "community of interest" in West European 
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